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SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS TO MOBILE TERMINALS
A FORECAST OF NEEDS AND TECHNIQUES
By: Q. C. Wilson
Acton Laboratories, Inc.
Massachusetts

ABSTRACT

intersystem and interorganizational relation
ships. Several substantial studies have shown a
specific utility of satellite communications for
navigation and mapping, administrative traffic
to air carriers, Atlantic air traffic control, and
world-wide weather data systems. The plan for
satisfying all these needs is a jig-saw puzzle not
yet assembled. However, air terminal congestion
takes precedence as the greatest need. Air
traffic controllers have demonstrated in a
dramatic and responsible way that they are
overloaded. The FAA has attempted to find suit
able relief in automation and display without
making progress against the tremendous in
crease in traffic. Proliferation of airports and
systems of the present kind will push the FAA
budget alone above one billion dollars and push
a larger burden onto local communities. A
better system seems to be promised by further
automation.

Economic pressures and technical devel
opments lead to an international satellite com
munications and surveillance system satisfying
the needs of many mobile users, especially
aircraft. The dominant need is to provide
three-dimensional surveillance of air space
around airports. The large number of carrier
and general aircraft requires the satellite
system and its ground control facility to carry
the burden of providing adequate link margins
and position computation.

INTRODUCTION
Economic pressures and recent technical
advances will lead to an international satellite
communications system satisfying the needs of
many mobile users, especially aircraft. It is
timely to encourage designing complete and
competitive systems in order to provide guid
ance to the ITU World Administrative Radio
Conference for Space Communications which
will convene by early 1971 to make treaty
regulations for frequency allocations.

Contemporary radar defies simple automa
tion. An air traffic control computer should
track every target. But radar was designed to
track single targets with the aid of an operator
who can discriminate a real target from clutter,
atmospheric reflections, multipath, etc. The
basic limitation of radar is that the returned
signal decreases by the 4th power of the dis tance. Transponders on aircraft cause jam
ming because of the poor geometry of groundbased radar. Satellite-based radar can over
come these faults.

Competitive designs will also provide
guidance to the Department of Transportation
for satisfying air traffic control needs and
navigation needs of many users. The previous
DOT administration has already requested the
aid of industry to this end. Vigorous design
efforts are needed now to prevent a drifting
policy detrimental to efficient and safe use of
national air space. System design is a vehicle
for conducting intelligent dialog within the
technical community and is a prerequisite to
sound budgetary estimates. A complete state
ment of system performance (including an im
plementation plan) can be matched against the
most critical needs as well as against existing
systems that may eventually be retired and
proposed systems of limited utility.

Fortunately, the technical base for a sys
tem which provides a surveillance function for
many users has resulted from military and
space efforts. Inexorable economic pressures
of air transportation will forge an effective
union of organizations to use these techniques.
By attempting to forecast .the economic pressure
and the most likely technical solutions, the
author hopes to stimulate extensive dialog.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
(TECHNOLOGY SEARCHING FOR A NEED)
Many studies have explored the feasibility
of using satellites to satisfy specific needs.
Some studies propose system designs. Their
general shortcoming is parochialism. Satellite
communications shows promise at considerable

Designing a system to meet these needs
will be an exceedingly complex political,
economic, and technical problem with many
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NASA Has Best Systems Capability but Appears
to be Withdrawing

expense. By attempting to satisfy limited needs,
the studies leave doubt that the effort is worth
while. Thus, the characteristic flavor of the
recent past has been technology searching for a
need.

NASA has conducted experiments and
studies of wide scope directed towards satellite
air traffic control. The Joint Navigation Satel
lite Committee provided comprehensive intragovernmental guidance towards system design .
However, their limited budget has been directed
primarily to the race to the moon. Futhermore,
Mr. Harper, NASA deputy associate adminis
trator for aeronautics has said that system
design should be done by FAA, while NASA should
concentrate on hardware.Recent research fund
ing cuts on air traffic control research and
ATS F and G satellites show that Congress is
not sympathetic to allowing NASA to take a
more active role in air space problems. Even
rather modest efforts to experiment with the
1540-1660 mHz band have been stopped. Industry
has noted that weak fiscal position and is seek
ing opportunities elsewhere.

However, needs are not lacking. In fact,
the air traffic control problem is so big that it
appears to impede organization by intimidation.
At last year's annual meeting of the AIAA
several authorities suggested diverse political
organizations that should or can do the system
design. New political unions are being explored
in order to bring the effort to a workable ad
ministrative level. All of these activities are
indicative of the pressures to form union that
will implement a useful system.
Synoptic Weather Data System Requires
Little Capacity
Many studies have considered imple
menting a weather data system using satellites.
Comparisons with aircraft interrogation
systems show an economic advantage to satel
lite systems. HF radio interrogation suffers
from diurnal variability and irregular perfor
mance. Buoys designed for long life in the
ocean have been under development and testing
for over five years. Missing elements appear
to be a data relay network, a position-fixing
capability, and reliable mooring.

An example of the type of system design
that NASA has sponsored is given in the TRW
NAVSTAR report . It recommends a passive
navigation system coupled with position report
ing by the aircraft back to the controller. The
aircraft provides position computation. Mari
time users are not excluded.
History shows that NASA is endowed with
the management capability to attempt to do new
and difficult things in full view of the nation.
This contrasts with the philosophy of an operat
ing organization such as FAA which has such
immediate difficult operational problems that
changes must be evolutionary. The solution to
the air traffic problem is going to require inno
vation. Although several organizations could do
the job, only NASA has recently demonstrated
this type of gut effort.

The benefits of long range weather pre
diction are really not known in fiscal terms.
The efforts of DOT to present a substantial
case before Congressional committee have
met questioning indicating that need priority is
assessed relatively low. Actually, data capacity
requirements are so low as to encourage
waiting to see what may develop in other satel
lite communications experiments or system
proposals.

RTCA, ARINC,and COMSAT Proposed a System
of Limited Capability

Marine Navigation Users Show Interest

The combination of the RTCA community,
ARINC, and COMSAT provides considerable
interest because it puts quantitative numbers
on certain needs. These three groups hoped to
solve the problem of air traffic control over the
oceans as well as to provide administrative
communications to aircraft. If FAA had joined
the union and accepted a limited capability of
ocean air traffic control (positions reported
back from the aircraft over the satellite circuit)
funding may have been under way by now. How
ever, the domestic airlines did not feel that the
capability of VHF satellite communications was
that great an improvement over present capa
bility to warrant picking up a 10 million dollar
yearly bill. Thus the aviation community re
presented by RTCA has given some indication
of the value of satellite communications to its
operations and the FAA has indicated the value
of ocean air traffic control in light of its budget
and political position on direct surveillance.

The Navy Navigation Satellite System
called "Transit" (NNSS) has proven itself
useful for ships and research vehicles as well
as for Navy requirements. Commercial receiv
ers are now available for about $50, 000. This
passive system depends on the doppler shift of
a signal from a low altitude polar satellite.
Ephemeris data is broadcasted to users. The
use of only four satellites at low altitude limits
position updating to every 108 minutes. The use
of low UHF frequencies ultimately limits accu
racy to tenths of a mile. The measurement
time is the time for the satellite to pass over
the user.
ATS VHF satellites have communicated
with a merchant ship 1 ,. A NASA (ERG) study is
compiling the needs of the marine .community
for satellite navigation* These experiments and
studies show the feasibility of satellite commu
nications for marine use,
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COMSAT Over-Capitalization Seeks Relief
from Charter Limitations on Opportunities

DOD is Not Directly Involved
U.S. military development has often
influenced navigation of the civilian and com
mercial air transportation industry. DME went
through extensive dialog before proving its
suitability for general aviation. Now news
releases indicate that DOD is investigating satel
lite communications under programs called
TACSATCOM and ICNI. These public announce
ments do not suggest that the proposed concepts
or systems will be useful to civil
aviation.
In fact, Dr. Finn Larson made clear at the
RTCA Fall Assembly that the DOD does not
consider this area to be within its jurisdiction.
It is probably safe to say that the tremendous
resources of the military will not be applied
directly to solving air traffic control problems.

The union is also interesting because it
illustrates complex organizational problems.
COMSAT by its Congressional charter cannot
sell services to individual users; it must be a
carrier's carrier. An exception (obtained later)
is that it can sell directly to NASA or DOD. This
and other expansions of service areunder fire
from INTELSAT. Thus COMSAT has national
and international constraints to look to in join
ing a union. ARINC provides a carrier interface
between COMSAT and the individual users. The
interface between COMSAT and FAA is presum
ably more difficult in that it may require Con
gressional action when the concept expanded to
provide control over the national air space. In
the 88th Congressional Senate Committee on
Aeronautical Space Services, Mr. Jaffe of
NASA objected to COMSAT activity towards
providing navigation and air traffic control to
ships and aircraft. COMSAT has surplus capital
and an aggressive management, to help over
come these inter organizational difficulties .

FAA and DOT Have Little Congressional Support
The FAA continues to fight its fiscal and
operational battles with courage and honesty if
not inspiration. Perhaps operational responsi
bilities of operations vital to public safety are
burden enough for one organization. Neverthe
less, FAA documentation and reports directed
to the FAA continue to give good account of the
situation. Direction seems to be lacking because
of conflicts in opinion within the FAA and between
FAA and NASA and industry. The question is
surveillance vs position reporting.

The implementation of a VHF communi
cations capability providing four voice channels
on three satellites was admittedly not very
ambitious but would establish early precedence
for a workable union. A j^reliminary study for
COMSAT by Philco-Ford anticipated that the
eventual system could be in the 1540-1600 mHz
band (so that it could provide position-fixing
capability to 0. 2 mile using two satellites).
Oceanic needs were assumed so VHF provided
sufficient accuracy. Actually, a VHF imple
mentation would probably have affected the
WARC meeting which will be held in 1971 to
study allocations for space communications.
COMSAT has filed with the FCC a request that
the WARC allow the 1540-1660 mHz band to
include maritime mobile service.

Several years ago, the growing load on air
traffic controllers led NASA and industry to say
that mpre responsibility should be given to the
pilots . Air collisions dramatized the need.
The momentum carried several companies to
cooperate with the FAA in a Collision Avoidance
System which would use a major portion of the
1540 to 1600 mHz band. These are now nearing
test. Meanwhile, in-route traffic control has
been sufficient to stop collisions between air
carriers. So far the results of the CAS activity
are systems which will cost each aircraft over
$50, 000 for a need which does not seem to be as
urgent as terminal control. Furthermore, the
system competes for a major part of the most
desirable frequency for position-fixing.

ICAO Takes a Long View
ICAO is the international equivalent to
RTCA. Last year it convened the ASTRA panel
to study satellite communications technology.
During the RTCA Fall Assembly in 1968,
comments were made by RTCA and ICAO mem
bers on the relative positions of the two bodies .
RTCA favored VHF without question, while ICAO
felt that it was too early to make a recommenda
tion. (In fact, France has already recommended
an L-Band system). ICAO says that the problem
is international and requires careful comprehen
sive study so as to not commit the world to an
inadequate solution. The slow acceptance of
VORTAC by smaller nations can be put in jeop
ardy by mention of a new system.

Actually, surveillance which depends on
aircraft-derived position information is incon
sistent with positive control of the National Air
Space and is not accepted by the FAA. CAS
seems to be an independent safety system which
cannot in the long run relieve terminal congesticn.
A surveillance system which depends on aircraft
reporting their positions obtains its strongest
proponents among those responsible for super
sonic trans-oceanic safety. Some supersonic
aircraft will use triple-redundance inertialguidance units costing about $300, 000. Cannot
this capability be coupled with a satellite
communications reporting circuit to provide
the necessary air traffic control ? Those in the
FAA who disagree feel that terminal control

The RTCA discussions indicated the many
subtle considerations that are required to obtain
general international acceptance of a system for
the world air fleets.
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remains the significant problem, especially for
the many aircraft without accurate navigation
aids.

Congress will Limit U. S. Government Partic
ipation
However, control of the air space is a
function which cannot be passed on to private
organizations without rending the fabric of the
governmental authority since regulation is
implied. There are proponents for either NASA,
intra-governmental unions, or not-for-profits
to do the system design for FAA. So far the most
interesting system design proposals have come
through NASA efforts. Congress, however, has
cut NASA funds towards this end. The R & D
funds of the FAA have steadily dropped. Thus, it
appears that Congress repudiates the responsi
ble government agencies.

The FAA is commendable in its reporting
of experiments . Both the FAA and its many
critics give a clear indication of the limitations
of radar as the prime sensor of the controller.
Critics emphasize the poor reliability of radar
while the FAA reports a struggle with the dis
play interface as well as with automation of the
tracking function. The FAA has found to its
chagrin that transponders introduce interference.
Angels and bad weather also confuse the display.
Thus automation of the tracking function is not
going to be complete or comfortably reliable.

The international aspect of the system will
lead to the development of regulatory laws
through treaty agreements of ITU and ICAO
members, and to system development through an
international consortium. International coopera
tion would broaden the fiscal base while permit
ting the least expensive satellite configuration .
Congress will enjoy release from the responsi
bility of difficult management decisions while
retaining a maximum of funds for defense
spending. COMSAT capitalization will start
development.

Meanwhile, the air traffic controller
continues to be overworked and even irritated
by attempts to help ease his burden since any
system test imposes further strains on an
already tense operation situation.
The FAA clearly points out that automa
tion is the least expensive way to relieve ter
minal congestion . Proliferation of airports
can provide the greatest potential improvement
but at tremendous expense to the community
served . The impact of this observation is
weakened by the credibility of the promise of
automation. Considering the limitations of the
present billion dollar radar system, automation
is only a partial aid.

NEEDS
PRIMARILY AIR TRAFFIC SURVEILLANCE
Automation is the least expensive way to
minimize termial congestion . High speed
ground transportation will be limited to very
dense centers such as between New York and
Boston and Washington. Since the U.S. is
committed to air transporation for long distance
travel, congestion is a fundamental limitation
on our capability to do business. Therefore, the
bottleneck will be attacked directly. Fortunately,
the FAA has been giving careful attention to the
causes and possible remedies to terminal delay.
No compromise with safety is apparent in their
deliberations. Organizations such as RTCA
10
also give insight into our domestic
and MIT
air traffic problem.

ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY LACKING
The DOT, through the FAA, obtensibly
has responsibility for our future air space,Fiscal
control is in the hands of the President and
Congress. The FAA has been criticized for not
vigorously fighting for funds to do its job. No
comprehensive and detailed long-range plan is
visible in the documents of the FAA or in its
record before the BOB or Congress. Since the
necessary programs are costly, funding really
cannot be expected without showing the Admi
nistration and Congress that an improvement is
needed and is possible at reasonable cost. A
spokesman with a detailed plan is wanting.

What then prevents automation ? The many
studies of the FAA lead to the conclusion that
the judgment of air traffic controllers is neces
sary to overcome the inherent deficiencies of
the radar system which is the primary sensor
of the controller. No significant improvement
can come from improving the control center or
the display system. Radar transponders do not
increase reliability as expected because they
jam the display system. It is necessary to look
at this limitation in more detail.

Q

Dr. Seiffert of MIT , Dr. Cherrington of
Harvard, and others who despair of the lack of
directed activity suggest that a super agency of
private form will become the chosen instrument
chartered by Congress to handle air traffic
control. COMSAT itself has proposed to build a
limited system. COMSAT is over-capitalized
and also limited by charter to few investment
opportunities. Personnel within the FAA are
sympathetic to COMSAT. Members of the
aviation community will give support. Therefore,
the possibility of another COMSAT activity is a
distinct possibility if the Congress does not
choose to solve the problem.

Air Traffic Control Limited by Radar
Radar does not give the terminal control
ler sufficiently reliable position-fixing data. The
terminal area may include over 100 targets.
Radar depends on repeated reflections to
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display these targets. The display often shows
clutter and angels from clouds, birds, and
multipath reflections. Omnidirectional aircraft
antenna patterns have deep nulls. Often MTI
circuits and aircraft maneuvers cause the
target to disappear. The controller must com
pensate these deficiencies by mentally tracking
the aircraft during holding or landing. The
strain during poor conditions is great. Futhermore, the shortage of controllers leads to extra
duty. Automation of the radar tracking function
is expected to help.

telephone communications have led to facsimile
and picturephone experiments. New airports are
being planned. No doubt all will be needed;nevertheless, our nation's commitment to air for long
distance transportation will require in addition a
workable air traffic control system.
New Airports are not the Whole Answer
New airports cause problems. Land
acquisition is often very difficult because of the
political strength of the large number of affected
people. Furthermore, if the new airport is close
to the old, interference between air traffic
compounds the controller's job or limits the in
creased capability. Finally, the cost of one
large airport is about the same as a world-wide
satellite facility. The FAA has indicated that
new airports are going to be the most costly
solution. The major burden of that solution will •
fall on the local community. Therefore airport
development leaders should be very interested
in air traffic control development.

The ARTS program for providing.this
tracking function, while also tagging the dis
play with identification and altitude information,
is now being installed in several locations. The
addition of the third dimension, altitude, comes
from the aircraft altimeter. The acquisition of
track still depends on operator selection. The
transponders have introduced a jamming pro
blem since the transponded signal is strong
enough to hide a passive target. It can even be
reflected into the backlobes of the radar antenna.
Automation has not relieved the operator of
concern for the correctness of his display.

Geometry is Important for Good Radar
Performance

There are many minor airports which do
not have a radar facility at all. Several acci
dents have occurred to aircraft off-course
while landing. The possibility of altitude error
has been often indicated. A need for extending
two dimensional radar coverage to these areas
has lead to FAA and industrial development of
low cost systems. Three dimensional radar is
needed.

Why does radar perform so badly ? Two
geometric factors (the signal strength decreas
ing with the 4th power of range, and the multipath and atmospheric effects on a signal which
propagates nearly parallel with the earth) cause
the most trouble. A radar on a satellite avoids
these problems for elevation angles greater than
20 degrees. Of course, this type of radar
requires several satellites to be visible simul
taneously to transponder-equipped aircraft.
Angle sensing can no longer be done by steering
a dish. In fact, this radar looks more like a
navigation system working in reverse. The
advantages are : a three-dimensional radar
which has nearly constant range (signal strength)
to all aircraft, several orders of magnitude more
surveillance area, reduced clutter and inter
ference from multipath from a transponded sig
nal, and no signal returns from weather targets
such as clouds.

The number of voice transmission between
aircraft and ground overload the available
channels and require frequent channel switching.
RTCA has proposed a digital message entry
device for automating and speeding up the com
munications process by at least cutting down
identification time
The mechanism for assuring safety is
spatial separation. Separation distances are
based on radar accuracies and aircraft closing
speeds. If anomalous conditions such as bad
weather interfere with operations, increased
separation is scheduled. Unfortunately, the peak
traffic loads at several airports are overloading
the traffic control system even in good weather.
Bad conditions cause the controllers to stack
aircraft in holding patterns. Thus the slowdown
increases the load on the controller and an
excessive delay builds up. The present solution
is a FAA limitation on the number of flights
during peak periods. Adequate safety is trans
lated into a limitation on the revenue of carriers.

Costs of Related or Comparitive Systems
Some quantitative indication of the need can
be found by looking at the present air traffic
control plant, the aviation industry, proposed
system costs and other large programs. Table I
lists these cost estimates. The table indicates
that proposed systems are appropriate for the
expected benefits and are similar to present
air traffic control expenditures. In fact, the sizs
of the industry will be a potent pressure towards
a usable system.

Other Solutions will also be Needed
Several alternate solutions are being
studied. Ground transportation such as high
speed trains in the Northeast are being encour
aged by DOT. Alternates to travel such as

7-13

matically is reduced to a position-fix after
passing simultaneously through several satel
lites to a ground-based computer facility. The
return answer contains the position-fix.

Table I -- Costs in Billions of Dollars
Satellite System with Control
Facility 12 . (5 years)

0. 6

Automated Air Traffic Control (ARTS)

1.0

National Air Space Program

0. 3

FAA Radar System

"

The above need is similar or even iden
tical to what is needed for an oceanic buoy
system. A position-fixing capability helps solve
one of the most difficult mooring problems of a
buoy field. Buoys need constant attention because
they loose their moorings in a few months. Even
untethered buoys become possible if they can be

0.6

FAA Yearly Operational Budget

0. 6

New Airport for Boston

0. 5

New Carrier Aircraft Sales per Year

2. 5

Sentinel System Authorized
Expenditures

1.8

tracked.
The cost benefits of a satellite system for
oceanic air traffic control is based on the nar
row flight path variations for economical super
sonic flight. The forecasts show that congestion
is likely by 1979. These aircrafts are scheduled
to have three inertial navigation platforms.
Using this reliable system to obtain the air
craft position for transmission to the control
facility over a dependable communications
system is the heart of several proposed systems.
However, the cost of this navigation surveil
lance package eliminates the less sophisticated
user since the navigation system alone costs
about $300, 000. Implementation would provide
good communications to many users but would
not satisfy the basic needs of air traffic control
in the USA. On the other hand, the implementa
tion of an air traffic control system for general
use would satisfy both needs for a community of
users at least two orders of magnitude larger.

Subsidiary Needs
Several important subsidiary needs are
marine navigation, buoy weather systems,
oceanic air traffic control, and collision avoid
ance aids. These are fortunately not as de
manding on satellite capacity as a system for
control of air space. In fact, oceanic control is
assured by a domestic system. These needs
require a small fraction of the prime power
requirements of the satellite system because of
their low data

WATERSHED IDEAS

requirement.

Initial assumptions have controlled the
style of proposed systems. This section states
several ideas which seem pivotal if all needs
are to be met. Since needs exert pressure on
the system design, this section is a forecast of
how satellites will be used to provide air traffic
control and other functions for the civilian popu

Long range marine navigation is aided by
Loran, Omega, and Transit systems. All of
these aids have especially useful characteristics
to different users. On what basis is a competi
tive system needed ? The need could be based
upon the long range retirment of Loran stations
(but probably not Omega stations which use very
low frequencies in order to obtain long range
even to submerged vehicles). The Transit satel
lite system uses a relatively inexpensive polar
satellite system and puts the burden of naviga
tion computation on the user. The basic reason
for considering a new system is to get wider
use from these systems by making the receiver
simple and doing the computation at a central

lation.
Surveillance and Communications Service
Not Passive Navigation
While past proposals have been based on
passive navigation, the future system will use
active radar surveillance with transponding
targets. The transponders also will provide
communications. All computations and messagerouting will be done by a satellite control facility.
These services will be offered to private users
through organizations such as ARINC, to mili
tary users through DCA, and directrly to gov ernmental departments. The service organiza
tion will be capable of dealing with national and
international relationships. The service orga
nization will be (or be similar to ) COMSAT.
There will be no direct military participation
requiring passive navigation.

facility.
A toll-type communication system,
available to users for emergencies and business
as well as for requesting a position-fix, satis fies the need. Present navigation aids are simi
lar to position-fixing by sextant in that it takes
time to obtain the measurements and reduce
them to a position. Sometimes bad conditions
interfere with Loran and Omega and occasionally
Transit. The availability of Transit for up
dating is limited by the few number of satellites
in low polar orbit. What is needed is a system
in which a user requests, a position-fix by satel
lite communications and the request auto
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Between 10, 000 and 100, 000 Users

SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGY

The large number of users radically
drives the system design to minimum-cost
user terminals. This single consideration will
select the type of modulation , the frequency for
transmission, and the radiated power of the
satellite system. It will cause the position com
putations to be done by the service organization.
The large number of users eliminates the possi
bility of free access : toll service will be avail
able to subscribers on demand. Each message
unit will be quickly handled to avoid system
saturation; therefore, the type of operation will
not resemble the processes of Omega, Loran,
and Transit which require human judgment or
manipulation. The reliability of the service will
be like that of the telephone.

Today's technology supports the type of
system which will satisfy the needs listed above.
Several companies are already entering the
breadboard testing phase on company-sponsored
activities anticipating
satellite communications
and navigation systems. The type of system that
is satisfactory for the larger community and for
quick position-fixing will use frequencies around
one gHz. Furthermore, the user terminal will
use a rudimentary fractional-hemispherical an
tenna which does not introduce a significant drag
penalty to supersonic planes. Consequently, the
dominant problem is how to obtain the required
satellite radiated power to satisfy the link
equations. Phased array antennas on satellites
having about 1000 watts prime power are within
the weight capability of several of our opera
tional launch vehicles. The present activities
are to determine the best type of array for this
type of system. The question is really a system
synthesis trade-off which also includes the
selection of modulation and orbit configuration.
Finally, input/output technology will be utilized
by user terminals to assure that the system does
not saturate.

Many Satellites at all Latitudes
System reliability will come from having
many satellites. Position-fixing depends on
having several satellites available to every user
at angles greater than 20 degrees elevation but
distributed around the user's horizon. This
minimum elevation angle minimizes the effect
of atmospheric and ionospheric conditions which
lay parallel to the surface of the earth and plagie
present radar and communication signals.
Furthermore, the user's omnidirectional an
tenna can be designed to have relatively lobefree performance over this fraction of a hemi
sphere. The large number of users makes the
satellite system cost a small fraction of the
total system cost. In fact, the estimated satel
lite system costs are comparable to costs of our
present-unsatisfactory system. In any case, the
satellite costs will not be provided directly by
U. S. funding.

TDM for the Satellite Phase Array
The phased array competes directly with
solar arrays in providing high radiated powers.
The phased array can also be used by the satel
lite in its receiving mode so as to minimize
user transmitter power. If the organization of
the phased array depends on linear power
amplifiers in order to generate simultaneous
beams , a 3 dB amplifier penalty effectively
doubles the satellite weight over a system which
steers a single beam. Time Division Multi
plexing (TDM) permits steering a single beam
to many users. Experiments have been conducted
by COMSAT demonstrating TDM modulation
.
The implied wide bandwidth signals do not need
to use high accuracy oscillators in the user
equipments. These arguments suggest that the
final system will use burst signals much like
the response of a IFF transponder to radar
interrogation.

The Air Traffic Surveillance will be Automatic
An automatic surveillance system depends
on air tubes with fixed schedules, like a railway,
to assure safe separation. The satellite system
will interrogate aircraft transponders as needed
to assure separation and will advise air traffic
control and the effected aircraft of deviations.
This service would permit positive control of
the air space for carriers and others equipped
with sufficient on-board navigation to fly area
navigation routes. General aviation, at lower
altitudes (as well as marine users), would use
the system as navigation aid available on request.
The air traffic controller in the terminal area
would be relieved of the task of using a radar
scope as the prime sensor for watching carrier
and business plane s. Furthermore much of the
controller's present communications traffic
will be accomplished automatically by the radar
interrogation system.

High-Altitude Inclined-Circular Orbits with
Phase-Phase Array
A few satellites in synchronous orbit do
not satisfy navigational accuracy or coverage
requirements. Such satellites could use a high
gain frequency-scanned array. Instead the satel
lites must have earth tracks which reach at least
middle latitudes. However, the moving satellite
cannot easily use a frequency scanned antenna
because the user would have to change fre
quencies according to the position of the satel
lite. Investigations of inclined synchronous satel
lite orbits are available
. These orbits and
polar orbits have earth tracks which cross.
Two satellites in close proximity only provide
the position-fixing triangulation of one satellite.
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Other orbits will overcome this doubling and
also reduce the crowding expected at synchro
nous altitudes which shall be reserved by the
IT for fixed ground stations. As an example,
a subsynchronous orbit causes the figure-eight
earth track to open up into a sinusoidal track
having no cross-overs. Four or five cycles
around the earth at 45 degrees inclination re
quires less ETR launch vehicle capability than
a stationary satellite .Station keeping is only
necessary relative to the other satellites and
does not depend on geospheric irregularities.
Futhermore, position-fixing implies simul
taneous paths to several satellites. Therefore,
a phase-phase antenna array is indicated.
Digital Input/Output Devices
Simple automatic digital input/output
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